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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide two distributed versions of Boneh elliptic
curve cryptography (BECC) algorithm. We give a proof of semantic security
for the first one. This guaranties that our algorithm is semantically secure in
the contest of active non-adaptive adversary. Furthermore, we prove that the
second version of our distributed scheme is computationally more efficient in
time computation than ElGamal elliptic curve threshold cryptosystem and
secure under the Subgroup Decision Problem assumption.
Keywords: Elliptic curve cryptography, Threshold scheme, ElGamal
cryptosystem.
1. Introduction
Public key cryptosystems are widely used nowadays in electronic bank-
ing, online browsing, voting systems and so on. While symmetric systems
are more efficient than the asymmetric ones, those later are suitable for key
handling in an intrusted setup. A well known drawback in public key cryp-
tography, is that the knowledge of the secret keys (like a server) provide full
control, and may be viewed as a weakness. Hence a new direction in research
named distributed systems. Instead of relying on a single trusted party, the
key is distributed among n parties and at least m parties must collaborate in
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order to recover the secrete key. m is chosen as a parameter of the system,
at the setup level.
The definition of semantic security of threshold cryptosystem used in this
paper follows the one stated in [7].
The decryption operation of the BGNC (?) used in this paper is done by
computing the discrete logarithm on elliptic curve. We use Pollard Lambda
algorithm (reference) which has complexity O(
√
T ) in time of computation,
where T is the length of the interval to which the message m belongs.
Our second algorithm Boneh elliptic curve cryptography (BECC) is more
efficient than EECC in terms of computation efficiency. We evaluate the
computational time of our algorithm and compare it to EECC[6].
In our paper, we focus on encryption and decryption time.
1.1. Organisation
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we recall the basic
definition and the scenario when dealing with threshold cryptography. We
present our novel threshold scheme together with a proof of security of this
later in Section 4. The other distribution version together with its complexity
analysis are in Section 6.
The security of the Paillier, ElGamal ECC (EECC) and BGNC cryptosys-
tems rely on the Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption (DCRA) [12],
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [1] and the Sub-
groub Decision Problem assumptions [2] respectively. So, building on the
ECDLP and the SDP assumptions, we prove that our distributed scheme is
semantically secure, in the meaning introduced in [7]. For the best of our
knowledge, this has never been done.
2. Related work
Several elliptic curve distributed systems have been proposed in the liter-
ature [7], [8], [11], [4], [14]. Our paper aims to introduce two novel distributed
schemes for the BGNC introduced in [2] following the paradigm of [7]. Fouque
et al. [7] proposed a first distribution of the Paillier system together with a
proof of semantic security. In [8], Fournaris proposed a distributed version
of ECC. However, no proof of security was given.
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3. Preliminaries
3.1. Zero Knowledge (ZK) Proof of Equality
In this section we will recall the ZK proof of equality algorithm given in
[14] to produce proofs of validity in step 3 of our threshold ECC, see Section
4.
Suppose that party B needs to prove that it has a valid secret share key
s to party A without divulging any information about s.
1. A selects two random integers a and b smaller than the order of the
cyclic group generated by a point of an elliptic curve.
2. It computes (a1, a2) = asg mod p and (b1, b2) = bg mod p, where p is
a prime number related to the finite field GF (p) on which the elliptic
curve E is constructed and g is a generator of the group G of the points
on E.
3. It also computes t1 = a1b1 mod p and t2 = a2b2 mod p and sends
(ag, t1, t2) to party B.
4. B computes sag = (r1, r2) mod p.
5. B computes z1 = t1r
−1
1 mod p and z2 = t2r
−1
2 mod p and sends (z1, z2)
to A.
At the end, A verifies that (b1, b2) = (z1, z2). If this is true, B has the
secret s. Otherwise, the proof proof = (z1, z2) is not valid.
The correctness of this scheme can be verified from the Menezes–Vanstone
elliptic curve cryptosystem [14]. sectionThreshold Cryptosystems
3.2. Formal Definition
A threshold cryptosystem consists of the following four components:
• A key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter k, the
number l of decryption servers, the threshold parameter t and a random
string ω. It outputs a public key PK, a list PK1, . . . , PKl of private
keys and a list V K, V K1, . . . , V Kl of verification keys.
• An encryption algorithm takes as input the public key PK, a random
string ω and a clear text M . It outputs a ciphertext c.
• A share decryption algorithm takes as input the public key PK, an
index 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the private key SKi and a ciphertext c. It outputs a
decryption share ci and a proof of its validity proofi.
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• A combining algorithm takes as input the public key PK, a cipher-
text c, a list c1, . . . , cl of decryption shares, the list V K, V K1, . . . , V Kl
of verification keys and a list proof1, . . . , proofl of validity proofs. It
outputs a cleartext M or fails.
3.3. The Players and the Scenario
The game includes the following players: a dealer, a combiner, a set
of l servers Pi, an adversary and users. All are considered as probabilistic
polynomial time Turing machines, playing in the following scenario:
• In an initialization phase, the dealer uses the key generation algorithm
to create the public, private and the verification keys. The public
key PK and all the verification keys V K, V Ki; where 1 ≤ i ≤ l are
publicized and each server receives its shares SKi of the secret key SK.
• To encrypt a message, any user can run the encryption algorithm using
the public key PK.
• To decrypt a ciphertext c, the combiner first forwards c to the servers.
Using their secret key SKi and their verification keys V K, V Ki, each
server runs the decryption algorithm and outputs a partial decryption
ci with a proof of validity of the partial decryption proofi. Finally,
the combiner uses the combining algorithm to recover the cleartext, if
enough partial decryptions are valid.
3.4. Security requirements
We recall that an active non-adaptive adversary completely controls the
behavior of the corrupted servers and he chooses which servers he wants
to corrupt before key generation. A threshold cryptosystem is said to be
t − robust if the combiner is able to correctly decrypt any ciphertext, even
in the presence of an adversary who actively corrupts up to t servers. Let
us consider an attacker who first issues two messages M0 and M1. We ran-
domly choose one of these messages. We encrypt it and send this ciphertext
to the attacker. Finally, he answers which message has been encrypted. We
say that the encryption scheme is semantically secure if there exists no such
polynomial time attacker able to guess which of the two messages has been
encrypted with a non-negligible advantage. The semantic security for thresh-
old cryptosystem is defined as follow:
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Let be an attacker who actively and non-adaptively corrupts t servers
learns the public parameters, the secret keys of the corrupted servers, the
public verification keys, all the decryption shares and the proof of validity of
those shares. We consider the following game A:
A1: The attacker chooses to corrupt t servers. He learns all their secret
information and he actively controls their behavior.
A2: The key generation algorithm is run; the public keys are publicized,
each server receives its secret keys and the attacker learns the secrets
of the corrupted players.
A3: The attacker chooses a message M and a partial decryption oracle gives
her l valid decryption shares of the encryption of M , along with proofs
of validity. This step is repeated as many times as the attacker wishes.
A4: The attacker issues two messages M0 and M1 and send them to an
encryption oracle who randomly chooses a bit b and sends back an
encryption c of Mb to the attacker.
A5: The attacker repeats step A3, asking for decryption shares of encryp-
tions of chosen messages.
A6: The attacker outputs a bit b′.
A threshold encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure against
active non-adaptive adversaries if for any polynomial time attacker, b = b′
with probability only negligibly greater than 1/2.
4. The Boneh-Goh-Nissim Cryptosystem
We recall that the BGNC presented in this section is semantically secure
under the subgroub decision. problem (SDP) assumption [2].
4.1. Description
Key Generation: The public key is (n,G, g, h), where G is a group of order
n, n = q1q2, g and u are generators of G and h = u.q2. The private key
is q1.
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Encryption : Pick a random r ∈ [0, n−1]. Let m ∈ [0, . . . , T ] be a message
to encrypt. So the ciphertext is computed as
C = m× g + r × h. (1)
Decryption : Compute
m = logq1gq1C. (2)
4.2. Correctness
The equation 2 can be written in the following form:
mq1g = q1C (3)
We have to prove that the above equation is equivalent to equation 1. Mul-
tiply the two sides of equation 1 by q1 we get:
q1C = q1(m× g + r × h)
= q1 ×m× g + q1 × r × h
= q1mg + q1r(uq2) (recall that h = uq2)
= mq1g + ru(q1q2)
= mq1g + run (since n = q1q2)
= mq1g. (since n is the order of the group G and u is a generator of the group.)
4.3. Distribution Version of BGNC
Key Generation: The dealer chooses an elliptic curve E such that the order
of the group of the point of this curve is p + 1 = n × s and such that
n = q1q2, q1 and q2 are two sufficiently large prime numbers. So there
exist a subgroup G of order n. Let g and u be two generators of G, set
h = q2u and g0 = q1g. The public key PK will be PK = (n,G, g, h, g0)
and the secret key SK = q1. It is shared using Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme: let f0 = SK and, for i = 1, . . . , t, fi is randomly chosen in Zn.
Let f(X) =
∑t
i=0 fiX
i; the secret key SKi is di = f(i) mod n.
The di’s must be different from q1 and q2 so that the decryption shares
ci may exist. We have to ensure that ci ∈ [0, T ] for a suitable chosen
T .
Encryption: Compute C = m× g + r × h as in the BGNC.
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Share Decryption Algorithm: Let
di = q1αi + βi, βi < q1
βi here is the remaining of the division of di by q1. αi is the quotient.
Define
γi = q1αi
Compute
ci = logq1gγiC
for i = 1, . . . , l. The share of each server will be the couple (ci, gi).
To convince anyone that the server i has a valid share di, it uses zero
knowledge proof presented in section 3.1, resulting in a proof of validity.
Combining Algorithm: Let S be a set of valid decryption shares
ci, i = 1, . . . , t+ 1. Compute
m = logBA,
where B = Σj∈SµS0,jgj and A = Σj∈Sµ
S
0,j(cig0 + βiC). The coefficients
µSi,j are the Lagrange coefficients defined by
µSi,j = D ×
∏
j′∈S\j(i− j′)∏
j′∈S\j(j − j′)
∈ Z
for any i ∈ {0, . . . , l} and any j ∈ S.
We will use this Lagrange interpolation formula:
Df(i) =
∑
j∈S
µSi,jf(j) mod n
for any i ∈ {0, . . . , l} and any j ∈ S.
So for i = 0:
Df(0) =
∑
j∈S
µS0,jf(j) mod n.
Thus
Dd0 =
∑
j∈S
µS0,jdj. (4)
We have that
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ci = logq1gγiC ⇔ ciq1g = γiC
⇔ cig0 = γiC since g0 = q1g
⇔ cig0 = (di − βi)C since γi = di − βi
⇔ cig0 = diC − βiC.
Finally
ci = logq1gγiC ⇔ cig0 + βiC = diC (5)
and
m = logd0gd0C ⇔ md0g = d0C.
Multiplying the above formula by D we obtain:
mDd0g = d0DC,
so by formula 4
mΣj∈SµS0,jdjg = Σj∈Sµ
S
0,jdjC
and by formula 5
⇔ mΣj∈SµS0,jgj = Σj∈SµS0,j(cig0 + βiC),
or
mB = A.
So the proposed scheme is correct.
5. Numerical Example
We have used Sage software to make a numerical example.
Let p = 100000000000000003 and q = 100000000000000013. With those
parameters we obtain an elliptic curve of order: 96000000000000001536000000000
00003744. We choose for illustration purpose l = 20 and t = 8. We have com-
puted two points of order n = pq :
H = (901696848398424513792042624183449898 : 919534227604146025519668445930592752 : 1)
and
D = (515582362393135083339332053520498553 : 934365455532976888281795609449803454 : 1)
A generator of the curve is : G = (744114534472669657966133843400531746 :
77435475791434420844416408483805765 : 1) We chose to encrypt a message
m = 10. We obtain the shares: [320, 15530, 213640, 1457210, 6593360,
22845370, 65658680, 164354090]. We apply the formula stated in the algo-
rithm, we recover the clear message m = 10.
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5.1. Details on Sage Commands Used for the Above Example
To obtain the two prime numbers and the suitable order for the field we
use the following code :
p = next_prime(100000000000000000); # this will generate
a prime greater then 100000000000000000.
q = next_prime(p);# a prime number greater than p.
n = p * q;
l = 1;
pp = l*n-1;
while (not(is_prime(pp)) or mod(pp,3)==1):
l = l+1;
pp = l*n-1;
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After running this code, we obtain a prime number pp with pp+ 1 = l ∗n
and this will ensure that the following command:
E = EllipticCurve(GF(pp),[0,1]);
will generate an elliptic curve of order pp as required in our key generation
step. When looking for a generator of the curve, we use
E.gens();
To obtain a point of order n we generate a random point and test if his order
is as desired:
o = 1;
while (o <> n):
H = E.random_point();
o = H.order();
The discrete logarithm in sage when the range of the logarithm is known is
achived in Sage with the command:
discrete_log_lambda(P,Q,[0,T],operation=’+’);
Here Q is the base, T is the range and the operation is relative to the group
on which we are working on.
Theorem 1. Under the SDP and the ECDLP assumptions, the distributed
version of BGNC (DBGNC) is semantically secure against active non-adaptive
adversaries.
Proof. We prove using the reduction process. We show that if an adversary
can break the semantic security of the DBGNC, then we can construct an
attacker who can break the semantic security of BGNC. Following this proce-
dure, we have to simulate data received by the adversary in steps A2, A3 and
A5 of the game A. So the proof consists of proving that the data simulated
during the steps of the game A are indistinguishable from real one.
Let us assume the existence of an adversary A able to break the semantic
security of the threshold scheme. We now describe an attacker which uses
A in order to break the semantic security of BGNC. In a first phase the
attacker obtains the public key (n,G, g, h) and he chooses two messages M0
and M1 which are sent to an encryption oracle who randomly chooses a bit
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b and return an encryption c of Mb. In a second phase the attacker tries to
guess which message has been encrypted.
We now describe how to feed an adversary A of the threshold scheme
in order to make a semantic attacker. In step A1 of game A, the adversary
chooses to corrupt t servers P1, . . . , Pt. In the find phase, the attacker first
obtains the public key PK = (n,G, g, h) of the BGNC. He randomly chooses
t values d1, . . . , dt in the range {0, . . . , n}. T is suitably chosen to efficiently
compute the discrete logarithm on the elliptic curve. As q2 is unknown and
T < q2. We have to simulate the value of T . However, as the computation
efficiency of the function log is well known, a suitable choice of T may be
obtained.
In step 2 of game A the attacker sends (n,G, g, h, d1, . . . , dt) to A.
During step A3, A chooses a message M and send it to the attacker.
He compute a valid encryption of M given by c = r × h + M × g, where
r is a random number. The decryption shares of the corrupted players are
correctly computed using the di’s:ci = logd1gγic, and gi = dig for i = 1, . . . , t.
The other shares are computed from the following formula
ci = logab,
where a = Dg0 and b = [
∑
j∈S µij(βjc + g0cj)] − Dβic. We have that ci =
logg0γic. So cig0 = γic, and by multiplying by D: Dcig0 = Dγic = D(di −
βi)c = Ddic−Dβic. We have also Ddi =
∑
j∈S µijdj, this is why we chosen
the values of ci as in the above formula.
Finally, the adversary returns
(c, c1, . . . , cl, proof1, . . . , proofl).
In step A4, A chooses and outputs two messagesM0 andM1. The attacker
outputs those two messages as the results of the find phase.
The encryption oracle for the non-threshold ECC scheme chooses a ran-
dom bit and sends an encryption c of Mb to the attacker. He forwards c to
the adversary A.
Step A5 is similar to step A3. Finally, in step A6, A answers a bit b′
which is returned by the attacker in the guess phase.
We have that d1, . . . , dt and the verification keys are randomly chosen
on the interval [0, T ]. So the distribution received by A during the key
generation step is indistinguishable from a real one.
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Also, the value received in step A3 and A5 are computed from the secret
keys and the values of the non-corrupted servers are randomly chosen on the
interval [0, n].
Finally, all the data simulated by the attacker cannot be distinguished
from real ones by A. Consequently, if there exists a polynomial time adver-
sary A able to break the semantic security of the threshold scheme, we have
made an attacker able to break the semantic security of the original ECC
scheme.
6. A Second Distribution of BGNC
6.1. The ElGamal Distributed Version
First we recall the distributed version of the ElGamal elliptic curve cryp-
tosystem (DEGECC) taken from [11]. Let the parameters of the cryptosys-
tem be a finite field GF (p), where p is a prime number, an elliptic curve
Ep(a, b) and a point G of order q on the group of point of E. Then we run
the cryptosystem as follow :
Bob’s private key is nB with 0 < nB < q and the public key is KB = nBG.
1. First we choose a prime number p > max(M,n), and define a0 = M to
be the message. Then we randomly select k−1 independent coefficients
a1, . . . , ak−1, with 0 ≤ aj ≤ p− 1; which define the random polynomial
f(x) over a Galois prime field GF (p).
2. We compute n shares, Mi = f(xi) mod p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where xi can be
just the public index i for simplicity. Convert each index i to a point
Pi on the elliptic curve E.
3. Alice picks a random number r and send rG and Pi+rKB to Bob with
index t.
4. Bob recovers each elliptic curve point by calculating Pi+rKB−nBrG =
Pi.
5. Bob converts Pi to Mi and deduces M by using Lagrange interpolation
formula.
Our novel distributed crytosystem runs as follows: The public and private
data are as in section 4.
1. First Define a0 = M , the message. Then we select k− 1 random, inde-
pendent coefficients a1, . . . , ak−1, 0 ≤ aj ≤ p − 1, defining the random
polynomial f(x) over GF (p).
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2. We compute n shares, Mi = f(xi) mod p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where xi can be
just the public index i for simplicity.
3. Alice picks a random number r ∈ [0, n− 1]. So the ciphertext is com-
puted as
Ci = Mi × g + r × h.
4. Bob recovers each elliptic curve point by calculating
Mi = logq1gq1Ci.
5. Bob deduces M by using Lagrange interpolation formula.
If an adversary wishes to cryptanalyse our scheme, he will have to break
the SDP assumption, which has not been broken to the best of our knowledge.
6.2. Implementation Details and Computation Efficiency
In this section we compare our second version of the distributed BGNC
to DEGECC. We focus on the ciphering plus the deciphering time of the two
cryptosytems. We have used Sage software [13] to compare the computa-
tional efficiency of the two algorithms. Rather then implementing the hole
algorithm, we restricted to the encryption plus the decryption functions, as
the other parts of the two algorithms are the same. As we deal with the com-
putation time, we take the average value of all the random values r. Also,
we have chosen q/2 as the private key nB.
For the BGNC, we have used T = 100. So, for a given share Mi < p,
write Mi in base 100. Thus, we obtain (M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
s), s depending on the
value of p. Hence, for all 0 < i < s+ 1, 0 < M ′i < 100.
W compute the number of point addition during the ciphering plus the
deciphering process of the two cryptosystems. This is because this operation
is the more expensive in time computation. So, for the DEGECC, we will
need r + r + 1 + nB + 1 = 2r + 2 + nB point addition for encryption and
decryption of one single point Pi. For the BGNC, we will need r +Mi point
addition plus s/2 computation of the logarithm with the Pollard Lambda
algorithm. As the value of s will have logarithm behavior, DEGECC will be
more costly then BGNC for large keys.
We have taken 3 curves of different key lengths from [9] and computed
the average time consumption of 100 runs of the two algorithms. We plotted
that and obtained figure 1 which slows the good performance of our algorithm
over the ElGamal one.
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Figure 1: Computation time with T
7. Conclusion
We have designed two distributions of the BGNC. The first one is proved
semantically secure and the second one is more efficient than the DEGECC.
While efficiency is considered a poor comparison parameter, it can be an
essential one in the setting of a sensor network, wherein energy consumption
is of concern, rathen than the security level of the scheme.
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